We investigate the R&D portfolio of a monopolist investing in costreducing and quality enhancing R&D. Incentives along the two directions are inversely related to the size of market demand, and independent of each other. The stability analysis shows the existence of a unique stable steady state equilibrium, which is a saddle point. Finally, we show that the monopolist undersupplies product quality as compared to the social optimum, while its investment in the abatement of marginal cost is socially e¢ cient.
Introduction
The impact of monopoly power on product quality is a vexata quaestio in the theory of industrial organization, at least since Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen (1978) , where the main issue under investigation is the …rm's tendency to distort quality downwards to extract as much surplus as possible from consumers'pockets. 1 This literature, however, (i) is based on static models, and therefore by construction falls short of characterising the inherently dynamic nature of quality improvement; (ii) leaves out of the picture any other form of investments, such as any e¤ort directed at decreasing marginal production costs, and …nally (iii) disregards advertising activities (either persuasive or informative) aimed at increasing demand or making the product more appealing to consumers and thus convince them to pay higher prices for it.
Here, we propose a model addressing aspects (i) and (ii), leaving aside (iii), which has generated a lively debate since the late 1970s, stemming from the pioneering contribution of Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979) . 2 We characterise the optimal R&D portfolio of a monopolist investing in costreducing and quality improving activities under full market coverage, and selling its product to a population of consumers endowed with di¤erent levels of willingness to pay for quality. Our results can be summarised as follows.
First, observing the control equations describing the evolution of the two R&D e¤orts over time, it can be established that a larger demand size exerts a negative e¤ect on both innovation rates at any time. Second, we …nd that, at any time, the two innovation e¤orts are independent of each other, due to the assumption of full market coverage. This is in striking contrast to the extant literature on R&D portfolios, where either complementarity or substitutability between product innovation and cost reduction usually arises. 3 Third, we prove that there exists a multiplicity of steady state points, among 1 This aspect has been largely debated: see Itoh (1983) , Maskin and Riley (1984) , Besanko, Donnenfeld and White (1987), Champsaur and Rochet (1989) , Lambertini and Orsini (2000) and Lambertini (2006) , among others. 2 The bulk of the resulting literature is summarised in Feichtinger et al. (1994) . For a later contribution in this vein, see Colombo and Lambertini (2003) . 3 The simultaneous presence of product and process innovations and their relation to product life cycle in monopoly and oligopoly models is in Mantovani (2009, 2010) , using the representative consumer approach (Singh and Vives, 1984) , which generates a price-elastic market demand. In these models, product and process R&D e¤orts may be either complements or substitutes and their relative intensity depends on initial conditions and demand parameters. which a unique stable equilibrium can be singled out, this being a saddle point solution. The stability analysis is carried on a Jacobian matrix which is a block diagonal one, the latter property being due to the aforementioned fact that the two dimensions of innovation are independent of each other. Fourth, the welfare assessment reveals that the pro…t-maximising monopolist disorts quality downwards as compared to the social optimum, while producing the socially e¢ cient e¤ort along the process innovation dimension.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The setup in in Section. The equilibrium analysis is in Section 3, while Section 4 contains the stability analysis. Section 5 examines the welfare implications. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
The model
Our model is a variation on the setup introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) . We assume the market is supplied by a single-product monopoly selling a nondurable good of quality q (t) > 0 at price p (t) > 0 over continuous time t 2 [0; 1) : The population of consumers is characterised by a level of marginal willingness to pay for quality 2 [
1; ] ; where > 1, and is distributed with a uniform density d over such interval. Hence, the total mass of consumers amounts to d 1. Parameter can be interpreted as a proxy of income or wealth. 4 At any time t 2 [0; 1) ; full market coverage is assumed, with each individual buying a single unit of the good, 5 whereby his net surplus is
Production takes place at marginal cost c (t), which can be decreased (generating thus what is usually de…ned as process innovation) via an R&D e¤ort y (t) : The monopolist also invests in product innovation (or quality improvement) via the e¤ort k (t) ; to increase q (t). The total cost function borne by 4 A similar although not entirely equivalent and less frequent approach consists in modelling consumer preferences by describing explicitly their income distribution. See Shaked and Sutton (1982) , inter alia. 5 Full market coverage may be interpreted as describing a situation in which demand size is known a priori because under full information the …rm may identify at the outset the position of the marginal consumer. Here, for simplicity and through an appropriate choice of measure, = 1.
where x (t) is output, while b; s and v are positive parameters. The term vq 2 (t) in (2) measures the instantaneous cost of producing a quality level q (t) using machinery and/or skilled labour operating at decreasing returns. The state dynamics describing the evolution of c (t) and q (t) over time are
in which > 0 is the decay rate of quality while > 0 is the obsolescence rate a¤ecting production technology. 7 Under full market coverage, x (t) = d and the pro…t-maximising price extracts the entire surplus from the pockets of the poorest consumer, i.e., it is p m (t) = ( 1) q (t) ; with superscript m standing for monopoly (cf. Lambertini, 1997, p. 113). The monopolist's instantaneous pro…ts are
and the …rm wants to maximise the discounted pro…t ‡ow
w.r.t. controls k (t) and y (t) ; under the constraints posed by the state equations (3-4), initial conditions q (0) = q 0 > 0; c (0) = c 0 2 (0; ( 1) q (0)) ; and the appropriate transversality conditions to be speci…ed below. It is worth observing that the initial condition on marginal cost says that it must be strictly lower than the spending capability of the poorest consumer existing in this market, in order for full market coverage to hold at t = 0. Pro…ts are discounted at the constant rate > 0.
Equilibrium analysis
The …rm's current value Hamiltonian is
where = e t and = e t are the costate variables (evaluated at time t) associated with q and c, respectively. The resulting …rst order conditions (FOCs) on controls and costate equations are (exponential discounting is omitted for brevity):
The accompanying set of transversality conditions is lim t!1 qe t = 0 and lim t!1 ce t = 0. From (8-9), we have the optimal controls at time t:
and the control equations
which, using (8-9) and (12), can be rewritten as follows:
The system composed by (3) (4) and (14) (15) identi…es the state-control system of the dynamic problem at hand. In particular, the above control equations show that the instantaneous R&D rates in both directions is decreasing in the density parameter d. Given that d in this model also measures the total mass of consumers, we may formulate:
The instantaneous investment rates in product and process innovation are inversely related to the size of demand.
The above Lemma captures a perverse e¤ect of mass consumption on technical progress which is often con…rmed by casual observation, namely, that expanding demand jeopardises a …rm's incentives to increase the built-in quality or technological content of a given product. The reason can be found in the fact that a larger demand basin ensures at no cost higher revenues which should otherwise be generated through costly investments.
Moreover, the system (14-15) also implies that
which produces the following Lemma 2 At any time t, the two R&D e¤orts are independent of each other.
This result contradicts a strand of theoretical research illustrating the presence of either complementarity or substitutability between the two forms of innovation both in optimal control models describing a monopolist's problem (Lambertini and Mantovani, 2009 ) and in di¤erential oligopoly games (Lambertini and Mantovani, 2010). 9 The crucial di¤erence between these models and the present one is that here demand is given and insensitive to the price level, while in the remainder of the literature on the same issue demand is a function of price. Hence, it seems that inelastic demand can be held responsible of the independence of R&D e¤orts in the …rm's portfolio. That is, when the total number of consumers queueing in front of its outlet is …xed and does not react to any increase in quality or decrease in cost, the monopolist's innovation decision along either dimension is solely driven by time discounting and demand and cost parameters.
Imposing stationarity on states and controls yields the following set of solutions, where subscript SS stands for steady state:
c SS = y SS = 0; k SS = ;
Looking at solutions (18) (19) and (21-22), it appears that the constraint
must be satis…ed in order for q SS to be real. If so, then it is easy to check that q SS is also positive. The stability properties are investigated in the next Section.
4 Stability analysis
The stability properties of the dynamic model can be assessed looking at the Jacobian matrix of the state-control system made up by (3) (4) and (14) (15) , which can be written as follows: which is a block diagonal matrix, as a result of the fact that (i) the subsystem (3-14) is independent of c and y and, similarly, (ii) the system (4-15) is independent of q and k. Hence, each 2 2 sub-matrix along the main diagonal of (24) can be examined in isolation. De…ne these two submatrices, respectively, as
and
Consider the point (17) . There, we have that the traces and determinants of (25) and (26) are, respectively T (J c;y ) = + ; (J c;y ) = (27)
so that instability arises along the marginal cost dimension.
In (18), T (J c;y ) = + ; (J c;y ) = (29)
where
0 by virtue of (23) . Here, (J c;y ) and (J q;k ) are both positive and (18) is globally unstable.
In (19), we have
so that again the marginal cost side of the system is a¤ected by instability. In (20) , the traces and determinants are
Hence, in principle, (20) is a saddle point. However, it can be disregarded as economically inadmissible, as it involves that product quality is nil. This, looking at the utility function of a generic consumer, implies that the latter's ability to pay q is also nil, and consequently the monopolist's price and revenues would be equal to zero. We are left with (21) and (22) . In (21), we have
which reveals that the dimension of product quality is a¤ected by instability. Finally, in (22), we have T (J c;y ) = ; (J c;y ) = (37)
in which both determinants are negative. Accordingly, we may formulate: 
Welfare appraisal
To complement the analysis, one can look at the welfare consequences of the …rm's R&D decisions. In the remainder of the analysis illustrated in this Section, we will examine a situation in which, under the monopoly pricing rule p m = ( 1) q, a benevolent social planner is in charge of choosing the investment path for process and product innovation to maximise the intertemporal ‡ow of social welfare discounted at the same rate used by the monopolist. This approach to the assessment of the (in)e¢ ciency of the monopolist's R&D choices is in line with Spence's (1975) original appraisal of quality supply in monopoly in a static model.
De…ne the instantaneous social welfare function as SW = + CS; with
measuring consumer surplus. Since instantaneous pro…ts are (5), the social welfare function is
The planner's Hamiltonian function is therefore
where the superscript sp mnemonics for social planning. The FOCs on R&D controls k and y coincide with (8) (9) , and the costate equation concerning the dynamics of is the same as in (11) . However, the presence of consumer surplus in the instantaneous payo¤ entails that the remaining costate equation is indeed di¤erent from (10):
As a result, the planner's control equations are
(43)
The above system reveals that the planner's incentive to abate marginal production cost c is indeed the same as the pro…t-maximising monopolist's (and therefore the investment in process innovation by the latter is socially e¢ cient), while imposing stationarity on (43) delivers
which can be compared with the monopoly solution attained by imposing stationarity on (14) :
The di¤erence between k
for any q SS > 0; in particular at the quality level q m SS reached by the monopolist in the steady state driven by pro…t incentives only. An analogous exercise can be executed imposing k = k sp SS and q = q m SS and then observing that the state equation of product quality simpli…es as follows:
which lends itself to the same interpretation. This translates into the following:
Proposition 4 Given the monopoly pricing rule, pro…t incentives cause a downward distortion of the steady state quality level. Process innovation incentives are instead the same under both regimes.
The driving force of quality undersupply at the monopoly equilibrium has to be identi…ed in the absence of consumer surplus in the …rm's objective: a benevolent social planner would welcome any increase in q to bene…t consumers, given the monopoly price and the corresponding (socially e¢ -cient) amount of cost-reducing R&D chosen by the …rm. This amounts to saying that, at the monopoly optimum, consumer surplus is still increasing in product quality. This reproduces in a dynamic setup a result dating back to Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen (1978) . Conversely, process innovation is socially e¢ cient: this depends on the fact that p m is not a function of marginal cost and market demand is not sensitive to any decrease in the latter. As a result, underinvesting in process innovation would simply cause a decrease in pro…ts (gross of all …xed costs). For this reason, it is in the best interest of the pro…t-maximising monopolist not to distort this dimension of its investment portfolio.
Concluding remarks
We have characterised the optimal R&D portfolio of a monopolist, showing that product improvement and cost abatement are independent of each other and both respond negatively to any increase in demand. Equilibrium quality falls short of the socially optimal level, while marginal cost reduction is socially e¢ cient.
